Posts Tagged 'Tehran'

Iran and the Democratic Struggle in the Middle East

By: Yadullah Shahibzadeh

Marx and Engels wrote the Communist Manifesto in the mid 19th century to explain the meaning of what they called; a specter that was haunting Europe, ‘the  specter of Communism’ and pointed to  “a holy alliance [trying] to exorcise this specter: Pope and Czar, Metternich and Guizot, French Radicals and German police-spies.”[1] The specter of communism was the metaphor Marx and Engels used to describe the popular struggle that was going to reconfigure the political scene in Europe entirely. According to twentieth century interpretations the 19th century struggles changed the criteria for deciding who has the right to govern and popularized the idea that all citizens have equal rights to govern. But this democratic idea did not prevent the labor party government in Britain (1945-1951), with a history that can be traced back to the Communist Manifesto, to do all that was in its power to get rid of the specter of democracy in the Middle East displayed by the Mosadiq nationalist government, the only democratic government in the region in the early 1950s.[2]

Since the late 19th century the specter of democracy has haunted the Middle East and Iran in particular under the guise of socialism, nationalism and Islamism but the democratic kernel of these movements has been eliminated from within or by external forces. These days that the specter of democracy appears with its real name in the Middle East; it seems stronger than the “new holy alliance” that tries to get rid of it. The new holy alliance consists, of Saudi Arabia, Israel, the United States and many European states that have opposed democracy in  the Arab countries because of their concern for, “stability”, the “peace process”, “orderly transition toward democracy”, and “human rights”, and Iran’s leadership which opposes democracy in Iran but supports it elsewhere. Iran’s regime assumes that the current Iranian democratic movement known as the Green Movement serves the American interests in the region and is backed by the US. Officially, Iran supports the democratic struggles in none-friendly or less friendly countries such as  Egypt, Yemen and Bahrain, but it prosecutes its own citizens when they  demand the same political rights that the Egyptians’, Yemenis’, and  Bahrainis’ demand.

Two weeks ago, the leaders of the Green Movement, called upon the Iranian people to take to the streets on 14 February as a gesture of solidarity with Egyptians and Tunisians.[3] Mir-Hussein Mousavi and Mehdi Karubi, the leaders of the Movement, sent a formal request to Iran’s interior ministry to make security arrangements for the suggested day of solidarity with Tunisians and Egyptians in their struggle for democracy. The call for demonstration in support of the Egyptians and Tunisians put the leadership of the Islamic Republic in a difficult situation. While approval of the Green Movement’s request would result in de facto recognition of the Movement and its democratic demands by the current leadership, denying the Movement to show its solidarity with the people of Egypt and Tunisia would expose the hypocrisy of the Iranian regime which claimed to have supported democratic struggles in these countries.[4] In order to avoid the embarrassment, Ahmadinezhad’s government did not respond to the request of the leaders of the movement. However, despite the tight presence of security forces, tens of thousands of Iranians took to the street of Tehran and several other cities. But unlike 2009 and 2010 demonstrations in which the demonstrators were chanting against Ahmadinezhad, 14 February demonstrations targeted Iran’s leader, Ayatollah Khamenei and the demonstrators demanded resignation of the leader. There are several reasons for portraying 14 February demonstrations as a turning point in history of the Islamic Republic. On one hand, the moderate conservatives who have shown sympathy with the Green Movement or remained silent since the disputed presidential election in 2009, started to condemn 14 February demonstrations and accused the leaders of the Movement to have broken away from the Islamic Republic in order to serve the interests of the US.[5] On the other hand, the leaders of the Green Movement compared the Islamic Republic with the pre-revolutionary monarchy deposed in 1979.[6] Yet the leaders of the Green Movement claim that they have remained true to the constitution of the Islamic Republic.[7] For the leaders of the Green Movement the Iranian constitution not only guarantees freedom of expression and assembly, and free and fair elections but also authorizes constitutional changes toward more a democratic constitution through referendum.[8]

In actual fact the specter of democracy has been all over the Middle East since the late 19th century, but the political moment which could contribute to its materialization has not occurred in such a wide and intensive manner. The current democratic political movements in the Middle East are in no way a result of the US or European projects of democratic reforms in the region. The project of building good governments which respect the basic human rights did not take into account that democracy was about the right of all members of every society to govern their common affairs. The twisting of democracy into good government and protection of human rights was based on some distorted assumptions. It was assumed, for instance, that since democracy was congruent with the current definition of interests of the US and Europe in the region, they presented as the only conceivable force to guarantee both building and protecting a democratic future in the region, a democratic future that has never come, because it has constantly been postponed. The postponing of democracy in the Middle East has been justified through the knowledge produced on this region. According to the knowledge produced on the Middle East the region is not ready for democracy unless its people are emancipated from their mode of being through gradual education carried out by the guarantors of democracy.

Now the reality of the democratic struggle in the Middle East tells us that the people of this region like all human beings everywhere can not only educate themselves but educate their educators. Not unexpectedly, in order to keep the traditional position of the educator of this region, the educators raise the question whether the current struggles in the Arab countries choose the failed Iranian model that is an Islamic state or the successful Turkish model.[9] The necessary requirement for raising the Iranian and Turkish models as examples of success and failure is total ignorance of the recent history of the region. The Turkish model as a success history is based on an historical amnesia. It forgets that with the eruption of the Iranian revolution and the raise of the Islamic Republic in Iran, this country was surrounded by the most brutal dictatorships in the history of Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan, all supported by the US and Europe, and Iran had to endure a brutal war with a member of this Western oriented axis of dictatorship until the late 1980s. In an area surrounded entirely by dictatorships, Iran’s attempts to unfold its own democracy is expressed very clearly in its 1979 constitution which until recently was the only constitutional law made by democratically elected constitutional parliament in the entire region. The politicians who support or lead the democratic struggle in Iran these days are the same people who founded, defended, and led the Islamic Republic in 1980s while Turkey was a vicious dictatorship and a US-European ally. So the prediction about the future of the Arab democratic struggle with regard to these two political alternatives is based on the one hand, on the confusion of the democratic potentials of the Iranian revolution with the current regime of Iran and a selective narrative of the Turkish politics since the late 1970s and early 1980s. This narrative would like to forget that Turkey was allowed by its Western allies to think and act for itself only after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The absurdity of the comparison between Iran and Turkey does not lie in the fact that the majority of those who founded the Islamic Republic of Iran are the leading members of democratic opposition in Iran, but in the original lessons that both Iranians and Turks can learn from the current Arab democratic struggle and display them on their own political scenes. The lessons of the democratic struggles in the Middle East would be of major significance for anyone who thinks that democracy is not a project achieved and completed by the West as the expression of the end of history and politics, and thus ready to be exported to other places.  The democratic struggle in the Middle East reminds us that democracy is a process through which a people in a society try to overcome democratic deficits of their government regardless of its name and regardless of its position in democracy ranking. This means that the inventiveness of the current democratic struggle in the Middle East would enrich conceptualization of democracy in general, regardless of whether the new holy alliance which is concerned with ‘stability’,  ‘orderly transition toward democracy, the ‘peace-process’, good governments and “human rights” succeed to exorcise the specter of democracy in this region or not.

 

 


[1] Marx-Engels,, Coomunist Manifesto

[2] Fakhredin Azimi, Iran : The Crisis of Democrracy, (London: , 2009,I.B.Tauris), p.273

[3] Mir-Hussein Mouusavi, Iran’s prime minister in the 1980s and Mehdi Karubi, Iran’s speaker of parliament in the late 1980s and the early 1990s

[4] Hillary Clinton exploited the situation without hesitation and  said;  Tehran’s crackdown on demonstrators, after it had praised the popular uprising in Egypt, shows the “hypocrisy” of the Iranian government. http://www.voanews.com/english/news/middle-east/Clinton-Accuses-Iranian-of-Hypocrisy-Over-Egypt-Protests-116194189.html,

[8]http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5202171,00.html and  Iran’s Constitution, Article 59

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EU sanctions against Iran

By: Annette Wolden

Since 2003 Iran has not been fulfilling its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) obligations. In response to the controversies around the Iranian nuclear program, the UN announced its first round of sanctions against Iran in 2006. New rounds of sanctions have since been announced in 2007 and 2008. The passing of the forth round, the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSC) 1929 on 9 June 2010, was partly a result of the uncovering of a new nuclear facility in Qom in 2009.

 

After the announcement of the new UN sanctions, the EU declared that it too would be imposing sanctions on Iran, based on the UN sanctions. However, according to sources, the EU sanctions go even further in targeting Iran’s nuclear program and in preventing investments in Iran’s oil and gas sector. According to the Council of the European Union’s press release, the Council adopted on 26.07.10 “a Decision implementing the measures contained in UNSC 1929 as well as accompanying measures, with a view to supporting the resolution of all outstanding concerns regarding Iran’s development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programs, through negotiation.”[1] The press release further states that “the aim of the EU is to achieve a comprehensive and long-term settlement which would rebuild international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program, while respecting Iran’s legitimate rights to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty.”

 

Officials said the package was “by some ways the most far-reaching sanctions adopted by the EU against any country”.[2] The sanctions focus on preventing oil and gas investment, stopping dealings with Iranian banks and insurance companies, and stemming financial transfers. What has been described by some as the hardest-hitting element of the sanctions, is the move to prohibit new investment in and technical assistance to Iran’s refining, liquefaction and liquefied natural gas sectors which are a mainstay of its energy-based economy. The sanctions are intended to put financial pressure on Iran, which is the world’s fifth largest crude oil exporter but has little refining capacity and has to import about 40 percent of its gasoline needs for domestic consumption. According to Mark Fitzpatrick, an Iran specialist at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, most of the sectors that have been targeted in the EU sanctions are ones over which Europeans have a substantial leverage.[3]

 

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast reacted to the passage of EU sanctions stating that “these sanctions will not help in resuming talks and will not affect Iran’s determination to defend its legitimate right to pursue a peaceful nuclear program”.[4] According to EU officials the sanctions will be the end for international companies operating in Iran.

 

By targeting the energy sector, the EU sanctions will have economic implications for Iran. The UN sanctions have already affected Iran’s ability to export oil. OPEC statistics show that Iran’s crude oil export has declined by 8.5% since 2005.[5] The sanctions have also led to a market shift, where Asia has become one of the largest markets for Iranian exports, rising from 23% of Iran’s total oil exports in 1995 to 36% in 2009. Exports to Europe made up 47% of the total exports in 1995, but only 25% in 2009, even before the implementation of the new EU sanctions.[6] European refiners still buy at least 238,000 barrels per day (bpd) from Iran, down from 608,000 bpd in 2008, while Asian refiners take roughly 1.4 million bpd.[7]

 

The reasoning behind the EU sanctions was to increase pressure for a diplomatic solution after the nuclear negotiations stalled last year. New negotiations were to be held from November 11-17. However, an adviser to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stated on the 31.10.10 that Iran would not discuss its nuclear program at talks with global powers.[8] In addition, Iran fueled the Russian-built Bushehr nuclear plant earlier in the week.[9] These actions both contributed to adding fresh doubt to the chances of a negotiated end to Iran’s standoff with the West.

 

 

 

 


Report from Teheran: The election sparks popular enthusiasm

By: Yadullah Shahibzadeh

Regardless of the outcomes of the Friday presidential election in Iran, this election has revealed new aspects and potentials of Iranian politics. The cynics of Iranian politics believed until recently that every thing, to the last detail, has been arranged to show the western world yet another boring Iranian election, as a result of which nothing significant comes out in the end. To make this presidential election more interesting, Iranian TV announced open debates between presidential candidates for the first time since the presidential elections started in 1979. Now after the end of these debates, the immense impact they had on millions of decided and undecided Iranian voters is beyond question.

The absolute majority of Iranians followed these debates, and have made the main topics and the details of the debates the object of serious debates as well as funny tales and jokes transmitted through newspapers, conversations and millions of sms messages. People of every political persuasion,  from those who are very proud of boycotting all elections to show that they are smarter then those who lead the political games in Iran to those who see voting as a citizenry duty no matter what the outcomes of the election would be, to those who have already decided to vote for the first time in their lives because of the miserable economic and  political situation they believe the incumbent administration has created  for their country, and finally to those who believe that elections are the best means possible to make a change no matter how little it might be; all have followed these debates enthusiastically. The expected high turnout in the Friday election is due partly to these broadcasted debates during which the presidential candidates criticized each other relentless and sometimes exposed the opponent’s share in the economic corruption in the country.

Another new phenomenon in this election is the unprecedented occasional demonstrations of the supporters of the reform oriented Mousavi in Teheran’s streets that starts every day from the afternoon to 3 or 4 clocks of the next morning. As a response to the government’s reluctance to rent the largest  stadium in Teheran to Mossavi supporters  on Wednesday, a human chain of more than 20 kilometers in  Tehran’s Vali-ye Asr street that lasted several hours has been the most stylish and powerful demonstration of support for a candidate thus far. This human chain refreshed the memory of many side walkers and participants in the demonstration of the great times of the Iranian revolution, the time of solidarity and selflessness, something Mir Hossein Mousavi is very proud of evoking in his speeches as well as in his last TV broadcasted interview. But more importantly, this form of political activity is what Mousavi has asked for since the first day of his candidacy. Unlike Khatami, who expected the Iranians vote for him in the time of election to carry out the reforms, Moussavi asks for their active participation with a revolutionary spirit. He calls himself an eslah-talab-e osulgara, (a reformer who remains true to the principles) a term misunderstood not only by his conservative and reform oriented opponents but also by many ‘experts’ of Iranian politics. The principles Mousavi refers to are solidarity, selflessness towards transformation of a stagnant political situation for the people and by the people. When we ask to what extent  the presidential candidate`s promises are realistic we simply think of the post-election performances. But I think in Mousavi’s case we have seen that he has fulfilled, at least, two of his promises, the opening of the political sphere and the spirit of solidarity he and his supporters have created during past few days that has made politics for hundreds of thousands of people, regardless of age, gender, education and social position an enjoyable activity. And in this regard he has tried and succeeded so far to revive the forgotten solidarity that Iranians have experienced during the revolution. The Iran of the past few days has experienced this solidarity through Mousavi’s ‘green wave’ or rather ‘green movement’. Now, the question is, can Mousavi’s ‘green movement’ develop after the election to fulfill its various promises, or become yet another memory in the collective consciousness of a nation whose political spirituality is understood by its artists such as Mohsen Makhmalbaf but misunderstood and hated by its philosophers such as Abdolkarim Soroush.


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