Earlier this month, the Nigerian government decided to more than double the domestic fuel price, from the initially subsidized price of 40 cents per liter. After a week of general strike, the Nigerian government gave in to the pressure, only keeping less than half of the initial price increase.

What makes a fuel price reform so difficult in Nigeria? Nigeria is the largest crude oil producer in Africa, producing more than two million barrels of crude per day(1) and cheap fuel is considered a birth right among Nigeria’s citizens as in the other OPEC member states. The Nigerian government’s ability to subsidize fuel is challenged, however, both by the vast size of Nigeria’s population and by the country’s lack of sufficient refinery capacity.

Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, with a population estimated to almost 160 million inhabitants.(2) This makes Nigeria oil poor when crude oil production is measured in per capita terms compared to, say, sparsely populated Kuwait, that produces around the same amount of crude. Furthermore, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) reports that because of “poor maintenance, theft, and fire”, Nigeria’s four refineries are operating below capacity. In 2009 and part of 2010, Nigeria’s refineries were operating below 30 percent of capacity, forcing the country to import around 85 percent of the fuel it needed.(3) The vast population and the lack of sufficient refinery capacity in Nigeria make subsidization of the domestic fuel price a very expensive economic policy for the Nigerian government. This may help explain why international comparisons rank Nigeria’s domestic fuel price above the OPEC average and even above the OPEC average within Africa.(4)

Even though subsidization of fuel implies great costs for the Nigerian government, it is difficult to make the citizens in Nigeria accept a domestic fuel price increase. Corruption and poverty make domestic fuel price increases highly unpopular and fuel price hikes have led to general strike in the country in the past. Nigeria receives the very poor rating of 2.4 on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), an index scaled from 0 to 10 where 0 is “highly corrupt”.(5) In December, the Economist wrote that “the most moderate estimates suggest that $4 billion to $8 billion is stolen from Nigeria’s state coffers every year”.(6) The corruption among politicians in Nigeria indicates a great waste of the country’s natural resources. To the citizens in Nigeria, it seems that they are picking up the bill for the politicians’ corruption. The revenues foregone by corruption could have been spent investing in poorly needed refinery capacity. Furthermore, poverty makes a doubling of the fuel price unbearable for many people. In 2004, which is the most recent year with data available, more than half the population was living below the national poverty line in Nigeria.(7) As long as corruption and poverty remain high, fuel price hikes will continue to cause great anger in the oil producing country.

 
1 OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2010/2011: http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/publications/202.htm
2 The World Bank: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL
3 Energy Information Administration (EIA): http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=NI
4 GIZ. Data Preview ‘International Fuel Prices’ 2010/2011: http://www.gtz.de/en/themen/33729.htm
5 Transparency International: http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/
6 The Economist. Dec 3rd, 2011: http://www.economist.com/node/21541042
7 The World Bank: http://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria

Most foreign policy analyses are flawed. They discuss issues and options on their own merit, as if actors’ behaviour were guided by our perceptions rather than their own. Actual behaviour is shaped by two factors: the actors’ motivation and their perceptions of constraints, external as well as domestic. To understand, we must try to enter their minds, admittedly a speculative venture.

USA
The policy and the capacity of the United States remain the factors that weigh most heavily in the power equations of all regional actors in the Middle East. What motivation and sense of constraint is currently driving President Obama’s policy towards Iran? His number one concern is probably stopping nuclear proliferation, to discourage other countries in the region from acquiring their own nuclear arms in response to the Iranian nuclear program, which must therefore be stopped.  A nuclear balance of terror between Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey (already host to US nuclear arms under NATO) and possibly others would be unstable and dangerous, placing at risk vital but vulnerably energy sources as well as the countries themselves.
He probably sees the Iranian rebuff of his original offer of reconciliation in the light of the domestic power struggle in Iran which makes any change of policy extremely difficult to bring about. Obama’s original rhetoric failed to change Iran’s threatening behaviour, but a credible threat of attack could hopefully shake the current Iranian perception of superiority and impregnability sufficiently to induce contending factions to compromise. In other words, since Obama’s speech failed to change Iranian motivation, he now tries to change the Iranian perception of constraints.
Should also this last-ditch attempt at coercive diplomacy fail, he will resort to force. He has no hesitation about this, should diplomatic options fail. Obama has stated that he is influenced by the so-called “Christian realism” of Reinhold Niebuhr whose central message is that there is evil in the world that needs to be fought, but in a humble spirit. Nuclear arms are definitely evil.
His acceptance speech when he received the Nobel Peace Prize was held in the spirit of Niebuhr. He would as US President use military force when necessary (“Wanting peace is in itself rarely enough to bring it about”). But he will calibrate his use of force. Military experts point out that even an underground plant can be incapacitated by a small charge collapsing the entrance and destroying machinery, such as centrifuges, by shock waves.
Obama’s own constraints are
•    His potentially limited time-window created by the presidential campaign since he could lose the election. The bad record of the massive and costly, but largely failed invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq by Obama’s Republican predecessor and the rhetoric of his Republican opponents, probably adds a sense of urgency to stopping the Iranian nuclear program lest a new Republican President once more resort to extreme policies that could create worse problems than those they set out to solve.
•    The twofold challenge by Israel: the need of any US president to neutralize the Israeli lobby against him in Congress and the US public, and in the current policy predicament prevent unilateral Israeli attack on Iran which could force him to deal with Iran in a different, more violent scenario, in which Israeli vulnerabilities could force him to conduct more comprehensive operations.
•    The need for Iran as a constructive partner in a post-conflict phase to stabilize the vital energy supplies of Saudi Arabia and Iran itself. Also for the political stability of Iraq and Afghanistan after US withdrawal is Iran’s cooperation needed since such stability can only be achieved by cooperation of the regional powers.

To overcome these constraints he has no alternative but to prepare surgical strikes, first as pressure and then, should that fail, as the ultimate recourse. However, to succeed coercive diplomacy and, if unavoidable, attack, need to be followed by military restraint and crisis diffusing diplomacy providing incentives for cooperation.

Iran
In Iran, the currently two main rivals, supreme leader Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad, by all appearances share the motivation of a combination of a revolutionary Islamic and anti-Imperialist ideology, and traditional nationalistic quest for power, prestige and recognition. The overriding concern of both is the protection of the revolutionary Islamic regime in Iran.
Their expansionist revolutionary vision is therefore constrained by their perception of any serious risk to the regime their ideology may give rise to. But they appear to differ over whether the nuclear program has reached that stage yet. When President Ahmadinejad initiated a compromise with the concerned outside world fall of 2009, the deal came to naught because the Supreme Leader Khamenei failed to support him when the President’s rivals seized the opportunity to undercut his position.  In fact, the main constraints perceived by any Iranian actor, may be even the Supreme Leader himself, is presumably the intense domestic power struggles which make anyone proposing to depart from the current course, e.g. the nuclear program, vulnerable to attack by rivals.
After all, an Iranian politician advocating compromise on the nuclear program will be faced by the argument that, seen from Teheran, the current pressure they experience along with their reading of the Libyan experience (Kaddafi toppled by Western military intervention after he had given in to pressure to renounce his nuclear program) combine to form persuasive arguments for nuclear arms as guarantee against forced regime change. Also, as in any nuclear state, there will be powerful vested interests behind a nuclear program, which offers position, prestige and income to those involved.
The crucial question now is whether the Supreme Leader Khamenei will have the power to change course, should he decide that compromise would be the smarter course for Iran. Despite whatever policy assets he may see in nuclear arms, the constraint may dawn on him that Iran will be stopped in its nuclear program because as the program progresses, the concerned outside world will increasingly see the risks inherent in Iranian nuclear arms, including the risks of proliferation, as worse than the collateral risks of a limited, surgical attack, should failed diplomacy leave the world with those options. Consequently, whatever the Iranian motivations for the nuclear program, nuclear arms will not be an option for regime protection. The only chance for diplomacy in the current confrontation is that the Supreme Leader and hopefully contending factions in Iran will be brought around to see compromise and a degree of cooperation as the only viable options for protecting the Islamic, revolutionary regime.

Saudi Arabia
The Royal Family, the governing political elite of Saudi Arabia, is motivated by deep-seated suspicions and resentment of Iran, a sentiment shared by the majority of Saudis and consequently an integral part of the regime’s political legitimacy. These resentments are partly due to the religious Sunni / Shia divide, partly political because of the declared Iranian revolutionary intent to overthrow the pro-Western Saudi royal family.
But those of the Royal Family in responsible policy positions are known to differ over how to weigh the perceived Iranian threat against the constraints on Saudi anti-Iran policies. The King has blamed the US for invading the wrong country in 2003, toppling the stable Sunni regime in Iraq instead of the revolutionary Shia regime in Teheran, urging them to “cut off the snake’s head, not its tail”. But others in the ruling elite are known to think the risks inherent in the confrontation the King seems to be seeking, outweigh the risks currently emanating from Teheran, even with the perceived Iranian encirclement by proxies of Saudi Arabia (“the Shia crescent”, or even “full moon”) .
The Saudi constraints are the potentially disastrous implications of armed conflict for the vulnerable oil production in the Eastern provinces and oil exports through the choking point of the Strait of Hormus. In addition, conflict with Iran also carries serious opportunity costs for Saudi Arabia, in need of cooperation with the revolutionary Shia enemy to exploit shared gas fields in the Gulf. This is potentially serious since gas deficiency forces the Saudis to divert export earning oil to domestic purposes, such as desalination and power production. In case of armed conflict with Iran, the Saudis also fear for their domestic stability should, as a side effect of confrontation with Teheran, Riyadh’s conflicts escalate with its Shia minority in the oil producing Eastern provinces.
The Saudi interdependence with their indispensable ally the USA constitutes another constraint on Saudi policy. (The huge Saudi arms procurements are seen partly as a conscious policy of prepositioning equipment for US forces, partly as a means to strengthen alliances by creating commercial bonds with Saudi Arabia.) With Israel the Saudis share the feeling of having been let down by President Obama in his refusal to support the Arab dictators against the revolting people of the Arab spring (leading to the first independent Saudi military action in contravention of US policy, the intervention in Bahrain).  But in contrast to Israel, with whom the Saudis also share the view on the Iranian threat, Saudi Arabia lacks the capacity for independent military action against Iran To compensate, in case President Obama backs down from attack on Iran’s nuclear installations, the Saudis, to retain the option of attack should they find that President Obama let them down again, even seem to have a tacit agreement with Israel to offer operational cooperation in case of an Israeli attack on Iran, over which they would have virtually no control, but for which they may have to absorb the brunt of the collateral damage of Iranian counter attacks due to vulnerability by proximity.

Israel
Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu is motivated by an overriding fear of a nuclear armed Iran, for the psychological effects it would have on Israelis, the sense of invulnerability nuclear arms could induce on Iran, daring them to more active hostilities by way of proxies such as Hizbollah and Hamas, and of course the ultimate horror of nuclear war, by accident if not by design. He apparently sees the Iranian threat in the context of the collective Jewish trauma of pogroms and the Holocaust. This sentiment is shared by practically all Israelis (although some of them will see the legitimacy the Iranian regime bestows on the Iranian Jewish minority as evidence that the issue between Israel and Iran is political, not racist).
However, there is strong disagreement in Israel, openly aired, over how to weigh the risks emanating from the Iranian nuclear program against the risks inherent in military options.  This disagreement is also reflected in conflicting views in the Israeli coalition government. As a consequence, the differences over Israel’s policy towards Iran remain unresolved at this time of writing, with Defence Minister Barak supporting the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Liebermann leading the opposition.  But since the differences are over tactics, not goals, this balance is volatile. Small changes in risk perception by individual Israeli politicians could change the balance and end the stalemate, sending off Israeli planes or cruise missiles from the Israeli submarines known to hide in the Gulf.
Israel’s constraints derive from the uncertain success of a unilateral Israeli attack and potentially disastrous effects of Iranian counter attacks, which in response to Israeli attacks could be widely perceived as legitimate defence by Israel’s neighbours, thus adding a serious political cost in the current volatile political environment of the Arab Spring.
Adding to the Israeli constraints, Israeli policy makers, with Israel’s total military and political dependence on the US, can ill afford to ignore the strong US rejection of a unilateral Israeli attack, openly and strongly voiced by the Obama administration. So far Israel has had virtually unlimited political capital in the US; no US politician would stand much chance of election without practically unconditional support of Israeli policies. But in the current American political climate, wary of new military entanglements, even US support could wither if Israel were seen to drag Americans into a new war.
To the military risks inherent in a unilateral Israeli attack cautious Israeli politicians are therefore in the current climate forced to add the combined political risk of Arab and American rejection.
But despite the fact that for these combined military and political reasons, the option of unilateral Israeli attack remains hotly contested in Israel, also in the current government, the unanimous Israeli view remains that the risks inherent in Iranian nuclear arms exceed the collateral risks of military action, unilateral, if need be. The prevailing Israeli view is that if left alone, they will go it alone.

Conclusion
In other words, the prospects of diplomacy versus war over the Iranian nuclear program are determined by the actors’ motivations and sense of constraints as outlined here. But the relationship between the actors is dynamic in the sense that their perceptions of constraints change by mutual influence. Therefore, the ultimate course of events cannot now be foreseen, although a US surgical strike against Iranian nuclear installations seems the more probable scenario at this time of writing. With the strong commitment by President Obama to prevent Iranian nuclear arms, a commitment shared by all possible alternative Presidents as well as US allies, Iran will be forced to change its current nuclear program. This will be an important victory for the efforts to reverse the dangerous current trend towards nuclear proliferation.

Israel, with its legitimacy disputed in its region, drives vital political dynamics in the Middle East. All contending factions in the neighbouring countries relate to Israel and its policies, directly or indirectly, one way or the other. The region is now undergoing dramatic change in its political landscape.  As a result, traditional policies no longer work, in the sense that they fail to achieve intended effects, and may even have turned counterproductive. Will Israel reassess its security strategies?
Inevitably.
Israeli security strategies have been threefold:
•    uphold legitimacy as a democratic, Jewish state,
•    project superior power,
•    deter and, when perceived necessary, preempt attack.
There are currently two major challenges to these Israeli security strategies: Iran, a threat aggravated by its nuclear program, and the emerging regional power of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Power versus legitimacy
To explore the changing circumstances of Israel I will draw on the ideas of a Jewish refugee from Nazi Germany, Henry Kissinger, who, as professor and central policy advisor to President Nixon, became perhaps the foremost theorist and practitioner of diplomacy in modern times, in the sense of developing an overarching historical thesis on the relationships between states, while he exploited options and forged deals. In an interview with Der Spiegel on President Obama’s foreign policy, with special focus on the Middle East, he reiterated his two requirements to stable and peaceful relations between countries: First of all a balance of power must prevent one country from overthrowing the existing order, but, secondly, to be stable, those parties to such an order must perceive it as basically just. None of these conditions are present in Israel’s relations with its region, but below I argue that the situation may evolve in this direction, conditional upon smarter moves by Israel in adapting to changing circumstances.

Israel’s problem
In the absence of political acceptance in the region of its existence, Israel has primarily staked its security on the projection of superior power.  Power projection is mainly effective against regimes controlled by one leader or limited ruling clique. But this is precisely the decisive condition that is now changing in Israel’s region as people take to the streets. They are not intimidated by power, unlike the dictators they strive to overthrow, but driven by a quest for justice.

Against Iran, which, pending the victory of the Green Revolution, remains a centrally controlled dictatorship, the traditional strategy of power projection is still the only effective strategy. But in relating to the Arab Spring, it has lost its edge to the point of becoming counterproductive – to the degree that people in the streets succeed in empowering themselves. Towards the Arab public opinion only shaping their perception of legitimacy will work.

Israel’s legitimacy undermined by Israeli policies
Israel has undermined its twofold legitimacy, as a democratic and as a Jewish state. The underlying problem is its failure to merge the Jewish identity with the ethnic, religious and cultural pluralism of a modern democratic state. This failure to forge a modern state identity in Israel causes a basic problem of attitudes towards Arabs under its rule, aggravated by the occupation of the Palestinians following the war of 1967. These attitudes towards Arabs have eroded the democratic legitimacy, while the Jewish identity has been undermined by imposing Israeli rule on a large number of non-Jews. The Israeli historian, Tom Segev, describes in his book “1967. Israel, the War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East” how evolving policies, not an original design, resulted in the current state of affairs, which is incompatible with the dual basis for the state of Israel, modern democracy and Jewish identity.

Balance of power changing
It was the new sense of power, legacy of the victory of 1967, that according to Tom Segev deluded the Israelis to make short-sighted choices, neglecting the long-term effects that created the current Israeli predicament.  As a consequence of the changes in Israel’s regional circumstances, the balance of power is also changing. Therefore, the internal political pressure in Israel, that has driven the occupation and the boycott of Gaza, is losing weight relative to the new external pressure; this must be the emerging perception of the power equation in the Israeli political elite, or so we must assume. The traditional strategy of power projection towards Arabs is becoming less effective, perhaps even counterproductive.

Israel needs to avoid long-term effects of mistakes
The current occupation, despite the overwhelming power behind it, will not be politically sustainable in the larger strategic picture now emerging. As a consequence, Israel is now, without an effective Palestinian state, set on a course that, if not corrected, will result in a new pluralistic state in which the Jews will be in a minority, and where the new majority will not, in the predominant Israeli view, share Israel’s democratic values. Under the current political trends the new Arab majority in Israel, which would be formed by the current minority of 20 % if joined by the Arabs on the West-Bank now under occupation, will likely come under strong influence from the Muslim Brotherhood and its off-shot Hamas. In the perception of the Israeli political elite, Israel’s dual legitimacy would then erode. Israeli fear that such an altered Israel would no longer be democratic in the Western sense because they feel convinced that current Israel’s western democratic principles are not shared by the Muslim Brotherhood, especially the equality of women and acceptance of political dissent. Nor would Jews, with the trauma of anti-Semitism and the Holocaust, feel safe in a state they no longer control. (In fact, according to the theories of the psychologist Philip Zimbardo, on the dynamics that cause humans to commit evil, the strong hostility Israel engenders could conceivably, in case power shifted hands, lead again to genocide.)

Israel needs regional allies against Iran
Where traditional power projection is still appropriate, the changed political circumstances of Israel make greater legitimacy in its region imperative. As Kissinger points out, without a shared perception of legitimacy, power will not produce stable relations. Israel will need political and probably military backing also from the regional powers to effectively and sustainably contain Iran, its overriding foreign policy concern also without Iranian nuclear arms because of Iran’s declared revolutionary vision aimed at Israel.
If Israeli politicians see a need to adapt policies to altered circumstances, they could take a clue from Kissinger. It was by his initiative to improve relations with China that the United States neutralized the potentially disrupting consequences of withdrawal from Vietnam. In the same vein, Israel will need to reduce current political tensions to forge regional alliances against Iran to off-set adverse effects of the changing political landscape. (At some point reduced tensions could even lead to improved relations with Iran. More about this in a later blog input.)
In forging regional alliances, the unresolved issues of the occupation and the boycott of Gaza will remain obstacles to those potential allies that share Israel’s concern over Iran. In Israel’s old ally Turkey popular resentment of Israeli policies limits the room for manoeuvre of the Government, should they find that concerns over Iran supersede resentment of Israeli policies. In Israel’s tacit ally Saudi Arabia, its ruling elite as well as its public opinion resent strongly what they perceive as Israel’s refusal to consider the Arab peace plan the King initiated, a sentiment shared by the other Gulf States.
Perhaps the single most important political actor bearing on Israel’s security interests now is the Muslim Brotherhood, an emerging regional political force based on political mobilization, because this movement wields significant power by its influence on Arab minds. But whatever the leadership could be persuaded to agree to, they will also have a limited room for manoeuvre towards Israel as long as the Brotherhood’s supporters resent so strongly Israeli attitudes towards Arabs, most blatantly manifested in the occupation and the boycott of Gaza.
For a balance of power in Israel’s region to be stable in Kissinger’s sense, alliances need to be more than tacit, transient, circumstantial or instrumental. Only a foundation of a shared sense of justice and perceived mutual benefits can provide peace and security. Perceptions and emotions shape motivation.
But should luck run out while a state of confrontation persists, even the coolest of minds cannot prevent everything from going terribly wrong; this was the lesson drawn from the Cuban Missile Crisis by one of crisis’ central actors, Robert McNamara, President Kennedy’s Secretary of Defence.

The risks of fallibility
Henry Kissinger, in the interview in Der Spiegel, described Obama as a “chess player”, Kissinger’s professed ideal for a foreign policy operator. In this ideal, Kissinger unfortunately fails to grasp the limits to rational analyses and control, limits described by the Israeli psychologist Daniel Kahneman, as I have set out in a previous blog input. Kissinger therefore fails to address the weakness in his balance of power ideal, how it can maintain under stress the stability which is its purpose. Kissinger notoriously fails to address the close call of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and in his own diplomacy in the Middle East in the aftermath of the 1973 war he acted more like a poker player, pressuring the Soviets by raising the US nuclear alert.
Kissinger’s Middle East brinksmanship of 1973 is an analogy to the current confrontation with Iran. The requirements of diplomatic pressure are seen to need the option of war to be credible. The problem for crisis management is that the path to building diplomatic pressure by making the threat of war more credible is the same as to actual war. When the parties to such a confrontation edge towards the brink of war, they could by inadvertence, if not by design, tip over the edge and find themselves in a situation immeasurable worse than what they set out to avoid.
Kissinger, in the interview, stated that the concept of victory in war is now meaningless.  There would be no victors in a war between Israel and Iran, only losers. Kissinger has joined other central actors from the Cold War in calling an end to all nuclear arms since they serve no purpose, but remain an existential threat. As a step towards realizing this vision in the region, trust must be established that no new nuclear arms are in the process.

From power projection to consensus building
But Kissinger still fails to address the basic risks inherent in any power thinking, be it by “chess players” or “poker players”: the ramifications if one “player” tries to outsmart or call the bluff of a posturing opponent.  Everybody could easily find themselves without bearings in situations resembling what Clausewitz described as “the fog of war”. Kissinger’s basic assumption is flawed, the primacy of the power equation, one nation’ power relative to others. Today, almost all national interests can only be protected in cooperation with other countries as self-motivated partners, while conflict entails huge costs to all, especially opportunity costs.
Kissinger’s work “Diplomacy” of 1994, setting out to summarize his ideas, makes his flaw clear. The book starts out with the peace negotiations following the end of the Thirty Year War resulting in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, in hindsight seen as the starting point for the modern international system of nation states pursuing national interests to be mutually checked by a balance of power. Kissinger’s hero was the French leader Cardinal Richelieu for his adept exploitation of this principle, then a novelty, to pursue the national interests of France. But Kissinger, in his analysis of the innovative principles driving the negotiations leading up to the agreement of Westphalia, commits a serious omission: It was not the novel principle of Richelieu, pursuance of national interest by power, that prevailed as much as another novel principle, consensus-building diplomacy, driven by the unassuming Trautmanndorf, the emissary of the weaker party, the Austrian emperor.

From confrontation to cooperation
Israel today, dominated by the spiritual heirs of Richelieu, probably needs to find another Trautmanndorf. He bequeathed the heritage of consensus by compromise, a necessary first step towards effective cooperation in joint interest, such as the current European cooperation.
In fact, only cooperation and economic integration along the European model can solve the really serious security problem in the region, economic stagnation and unemployment. Especially young unemployed men are a ticking bomb in any society. Only effective economic cooperation can prevent despair, desperation and aggression caused by a feeling of hopelessness.  To cope with this security threat, Israel could, in the spirit of Trautmanndorf rather than Richelieu, take the European Union’s agreement with those non- members that qualify for membership, the European Economic Area, a proven instrument for peace, security and prosperity, and suggest to neighbouring countries and the Palestinian Authority that relevant parts of it could be applied selectively and gradually. That could be a beginning to a new regional process that in everybody’s interest.

Israel’s options
What can Israel now do to escape the long-term effects of the mistakes of 1967 that Tom Segev points out? In this perception of the current predicament, the only option available to Israel is to exercise its right to terminate the occupation of the West Bank. (Israel already did so in Gaza.) In the same vein, the single most effective move to counter Iranian ability to conduct “asymmetric warfare” in Lebanon would be to reach an agreement with the post-Assad regime in Syria over the Golan, to deprive Iran of its channel to Hezbollah.
Kissinger’s point that those parties to the political order must perceive it as basically just, or legitimate, has important implications for both Israeli and western considerations of strategies in the altered circumstances: It matters what the Muslim Brotherhood, the emerging regional political power, thinks of Israel and the West, perhaps even more than what Israel and the West think of them. They are today the most effective channel for influencing the perceptions of the new emerging elite that will shape Israel’s vicinity.

Conclusion
Israel, in its inevitable reassessment of its security strategies, may lament the passing of the old dictators for the stability they provided, but indulging in such counterfactual thoughts, which some Israeli seem to do, remains an exercise in futility.  Within Israeli power, however, is the ability to influence perceptions among the emerging Arab political elites of options in relating to Israel, on the continuum between confrontation and cooperation.

In a previous blog contribution I have raised doubts about the realism of Israeli, Iranian and Saudi Arabian perceptions, both of each other’s power and intentions as well as the risks inherent in war. As they edge dangerously towards the brink of war over the prospects of Iranian nuclear arms, the question becomes imperative of how these perceptions are shaped?

The Israeli psychologist Daniel Kahneman won the Nobel Prize in economics in 2002 for his application of insights into the limitations of the human mind in decision making, questioning the realism of the traditional models premised on decisions reached exclusively by rationally weighing options. Applying his theories to political decision making about war, he warns against misperceptions built into the human mind[1], in short:

• Overrate own capabilities and control of events,
• Exaggerate the evil intentions of adversaries,
• Misjudge how adversaries perceive us,
• Expect adversaries to understand that our own behaviour may be dictated by the constraints of circumstances, but attribute adversaries’ perceived hostile behaviour to their nature, character or persistent motives.

These warnings stare us in the face when we consider the current narratives of Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Their narratives share basic messages, but cast each other in reverse roles of aggressor and victim.

To overcome the cognitive limitations that Kahneman points out, it is necessary to critically examine the historical analogies that form the narratives. In fact, applying historical analogies is our only way to analyse policy options along the continuum between confrontation and cooperation. We think about policies in terms of alternative scenarios. A scenario is a narrative about what has not yet happened based on an interpretation of what has. But our concept of the past is a construct.  We are forced to make a choice among the infinite number of variables that shape political reality; consequently, any description is a choice. Besides, each new policy choice will face a unique set of circumstances since there is no repetition in history. Yet, there will be a generic core in each new policy dilemma. Henry Kissinger, a central analyst and political actor during the Cold War, set out the relevance of his study of the Congress of Vienna following the Napoleonic upheavals of Europe by maintaining that “history teaches by analogy”.  Following up on Kissinger’s dictum I maintain that historical analogies are relevant to the degree they are believed to be. No new situation is identical to any previous, but there will be elements that can be transferred and lessons to be learnt, especially from such recent formative experiences as the Cold War. The current reading of the Cold War is mostly mindless. Rarely do analyses extend beyond the simplistic image of “We, the West, won; they, the Soviets, lost”.

The current dangerous crisis in the triangle of Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia is mainly driven by the Iranian nuclear program. Still, Iran seems to misjudge the implications, and instead appears to be driven by a sense of strength following the perceived weakening of their adversaries following the US defeat they see in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this, Iran resembles the state of mind of the Soviet Union in 1975. That year the Soviet leaders experienced a similar hubris following the US withdrawal from Vietnam, which precipitated an aggressive foreign policy starting in Africa and ending in Afghanistan.  (The legacy today is two failed states, Somalia and Afghanistan, that prior to becoming pawns in other countries’ rivalries were on the threshold to modernity, but are now the source of great suffering and cause of dangerous regional instability.)

The year 1975 launched a new era of cooperation with the signing of the Helsinki accord on Cooperation and Security in Europe. The Soviet agreed to principles of human rights, an agreement that, although entered into in bad faith, nevertheless proved to undermine the Eastern bloc regimes, contributing to their eventual demise at the beginning of the 1990’s. Yet, the policy of cooperation and dialogue gave the Soviet leaders a false sense of supremacy, seducing the leaders, obsessed with prestige and power and deluded by ideology, to the catastrophic foreign policy adventures that caused the climate of cooperation of 1975 to turn into a deep frozen Cold War only five years later, leading the world to the brink of nuclear war in 1983 as the result of misreading of intentions.

What are the lessons for dealing with Iran today? First of all, a non-confrontational approach could prove a more effective policy for advancing regime change than threats, probably even more so in a pluralistic polity like Iran. But avoiding political confrontation is not in itself enough to prevent dangerous misjudgements since it could be misread as weakness and tempt the adversary to exploit the situation. In hindsight it becomes obvious that what caused detente to turn into dangerous confrontation were exactly the misjudgements built into the human mind that Daniel Kahneman received the Nobel Prize for identifying in the field of economics. Kahneman would find all his insights into to fallibility of decision making confirmed by the decision makers in both the West and the East during this period, as he no doubt will today in the confrontational relationships in the triangle of Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Obviously, only effective dialogue, by balancing advocacy of owns views with exploring the adversary’s, can overcome these fallacies of the human mind.  This is as true in interstate relations as it is in interpersonal communication. But if it is so obvious, why is it so difficult?  Again, the answer is found in the way our minds are wired, and the solution is to be found in understanding this connection and learning how to deal with it. Kahneman points out that our brains react with positive emotions when our views are confirmed, but cause discomfort when we are contradicted.  In the words of the British Ambassador during my posting at the UN, Sir Crispin: “Gentlemen, let us never forget, we are all animals”.

Given these constraints, how can we bring the “human animals” to better understand, cope and cooperate on win-win options?  Professor Daniel Shapiro at Harvard Program on Negotiation has identified five core emotional concerns that affect our will and ability to overcome the fallacies that Kahneman find potentially catastrophic:

1.           Appreciation: The desire to feel understood and honestly valued.

2.          Affiliation: Recognizing shared identity traits.

3.          Autonomy:  Making decisions without imposition.

4.           Status: Positive emotions grow when status increases self-esteem; Negative emotions fester in competition for status.

5.            Role: A role should fulfill emotional needs. Temporary roles may facilitate communication and compromise.

These concerns form the generic core of the motivation for all political behavior. They will therefore be the litmus test for any constructive political process in the triangle of Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Daniel Kahneman’s  good news is that when we chose to engage in deliberation, yet another part of our brain is activated.

Under finanskrisens mest akutte fase for tre år siden stupte råoljeprisene til under 50 dollar per fat. Nå er prisen rundt 110 dollar til tross for en ny økonomisk nedgang i OECD-området og svak vekst i verdensøkonomien. En av flere faktorer som kan forklare denne utviklingen er den politiske utviklingen i MENA-landene. Særlig bortfallet av oljeproduksjon i Libya var viktig siden landet normalt er en betydelig nettoeksportør av råolje. Produksjonsfallet i Libya ble riktignok motvirket av at andre OPEC-land – særlig Saudi Arabia – økte sin produksjon. Men den politiske utviklingen i mange arabiske land siden høsten 2010 har gjort at aktører i oljemarkedet er mer bekymret for usikkerheten i leveransene av råolje enn tidligere. Det gjør at dagens råoljepris inneholder en slags risikopremie. Denne premien vil normalt avta gradvis hvis den overhodet gjør det, og i så fall vil det skje som følge av en normalisering av politiske forhold i MENA-landene.  Skulle derimot flere av landene ende opp med stammefeider fordi nasjonalstatene er svake og ikke har høy legitimitet i befolkningen, vil antakelig en slik politisk risikopremie kunne vare lenge.

Det er vanskelig å spå om den politiske utviklingen i MENA-landene og situasjonen er langt fra avklart. Det er imidlertid grunn til å reflektere litt over hva som kan bli utviklingen i oljemarkedet dersom mange MENA-land skulle lykkes med en demokratisk utvikling framover. Ifølge IEAs ferske World Energy Outlook er det ventet at MENA-landenes vekst i oljeproduksjonen fram mot 2035 vil utgjøre over 90% av den globale produksjonsveksten. Her skal vi først og fremst diskutere hvordan OPEC kan tenkes å bli påvirket. Man kan spørre seg om et OPEC bestående i større grad av demokratiske regimer vil ha større samhold enn et OPEC bestående av udemokratiske regimer med svak legitimitet i befolkningen.

Før vi forsøker å si noe om dette, bør vi minne om at mange har spådd OPECs endelikt tidligere. Nobelprisvinner i økonomi Milton Friedman mente allerede på 1970-tallet at OPEC ville gå i oppløsning fordi karteller ikke er økonomisk bærekraftige. Fra midt på 1980-tallet da Saudi-Arabia la om sin produksjonspolitikk og til langt ut på 1990-tallet var det mange som mente at OPECs samhold var i ferd med å forsvinne og at oljeprisene ville forbli lave. 2000-tallet har gjort slike spekulasjoner til skamme. Samholdet i OPECs kjerne, som omfatter arabiske land pluss Iran, kan lettere forstås når man tar i betraktning at både de autokratiske statslederne og befolkningen oppfatter seg som del av en større politisk og kulturell enhet hvor tradisjonell nasjonalstatlig lojalitet kommer i bakre rekke. Som en saudisk økonom i utviklingsdepartementet sa til oss en gang; først muslim, så araber, dernest saudier. De færreste nordmenn ville nok ha sagt; først kristen, så europeer, dernest norsk. Det er vanskelig å se for seg at noen medlemmer av OPECs kjerne (typisk Kuwait og Saudi-Arabia) kan sette i gang med en ”egoistisk” nasjonalstatlig oljepolitikk uten at det ville få betydelige politiske følger. Det gjelder både i forholdet til andre arabiske land og i forhold til egen befolkning som ikke føler spesiell lojalitet til et lederskap som lever høyt på strå i forhold til den jevne araber. En ren nasjonal strategi vil nødvendigvis måtte gå på bekostning av andre OPEC-medlemmer som ikke kan ekspandere sin produksjon og dermed vil kunne komme i alvorlige økonomiske problemer.

Høy befolkningsvekst og fallende levestandard har lenge preget mange MENA-land og gitt grobunn for politisk misnøye. I land med store oljeinntekter har man kunnet dempe denne misnøyen med sjenerøse ytelser fra staten uten å måtte ilegge skatter. Forutsetningen har vært at oljeinntektene var store nok, og på 2000-tallet ble de det. Men det er begrenset hvor mye oljeinntektene kan vokse; i noen land av ressursgrunner, i andre land fordi etterspørselen på verdensmarkedet kan falle. Uten et system hvor offentlige ytelser som utdanning og sosiale tjenester kan øke i takt med befolkningsveksten, fordi man verken kan beskatte innbyggerne eller øke oljeinntektene, får man problemer og potensiell ustabilitet.

Med en demokratisk utvikling og folkelig representasjon i styrende organer, er det mulig å skattefinansiere deler av offentlig sektor i OPEC-landene. I EU er statsgjelden høy, skattene for lave i forhold til dagens utgifter og det demokratiske styresettet blir utfordret ved at politisk valgte ledere gir seg til fordel for ”teknokrater”. I mange OPEC-land kan man nå tenke seg muligheten for å gå motsatt vei ved å innføre demokrati, øke beskatningen og tilby tjenester som befolkningen etterspør, og som en mer diversifisert økonomisk og politisk utvikling krever. Det betyr at avhengigheten av høye oljeinntekter for å finansiere offentlige utgifter kan bli redusert. Når budsjetthensyn i mindre grad er direkte koblet til høye oljeinntekter, kan det tenkes at samholdet i OPEC i mindre grad blir sårbart for nasjonale solospill. Dette tror vi vil være den mest sannsynlige effekten på kort og mellomlang sikt. En demokratisk utvikling i MENA-landene vil ikke framstå som en utfordring for samholdet i OPEC. På virkelig lang sikt kan man derimot se for seg muligheten for at nasjonalstatene blir viktigere enheter, på bekostning av den religiøse, regionale og etniske enheten i MENA. Da vil noe av ”limet” i OPEC bli svakere og nasjonale hensyn få større vekt enn i dag på bekostning av hensynet til andre land i regionen.

The conflict in Libya has led to a steep fall in oil production in the North African OPEC member, oil installations have been damaged and migrants have returned home. Furthermore, if the aftershock of the financial crisis leads to a sharp decline in global activity, it will put downward pressure on international energy prices, which implies a further reduction in the Libyan state’s revenues.[1] Libya’s new regime is provided with a window of opportunity to restructure Libya’s economy. And so, today’s economic challenges in Libya may be a blessing for Libya’s economy in the long run.

The founder of OPEC, Pérez Alfonzo, said in an interview[2] during the booming 1970s that petroleum was the devil’s excrement; “Look at this locura [(madness)] – waste, corruption, consumption, our public services falling apart …” The petroleum spending locura continued after the booming 1970s for the OPEC members. Today, the locura of the past necessitates a restructuring of Libya’s economy. With this year’s disruptions to Libya’s economy, people are likely prepared for changes. And the fall of Gaddafi’s regime provides people with hope for improved economic performance in the long run. With people in Libya prepared for changes – and hopeful that economic reforms will improve the current situation – the new regime can make wonders.

Libya’s economy under Gaddafi was characterized by corruption, mismatches in the labor market, and a poor business environment.[3] So, there is room for increasing both the size of the cake and the piece of the cake that goes to the poorest people. As international sanctions are removed and Gaddafi’s assets unfrozen,[4] large resources will become available to the new regime. As the fiscal space increases, the new regime is put to the test; will the new regime be tempted to evolve on politically motivated extravagant spending as the economy improves, just like Gaddafi’s regime? As Besley and Persson[5] argue, “almost all dimensions of state development and effectiveness are positively correlated” and “coevolve in a complex web of interdependent causality”. If the window of opportunity to restructure Libya’s economy is acted on, then political and economic stability may reinforce each other in Libya in the time to come.

The ancient Chinese theorist on strategy from 476 – 221 BC, Sun Tzu, whose presumed timeless observations have been embraced by such diverse figures as Napoleon, Mao Zedong and Vo Nguyen Giap, as well as modern military and business leaders, do Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia heed him in the current confrontation? In his work, The Art of War, Sun Tzu warns in part III, Attack by Stratagem, “If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”

Are their self-assessment and their perceptions of their adversaries entirely realistic, given the stakes and risks of the conflict?

Iran’s supreme leader, Khamenei, seems emboldened by the perceived US failures in Iraq and Afghanistan and impending US withdrawal from Iraq to continue defying concerned countries with confrontational rhetoric and the nuclear program, presumably trusting Iran’s ability to prevail politically and ride out any attack. Should this indeed be his perception, he probably underestimates Iran’s vulnerabilities, likely to be further aggravated soon by sanctions against Iran’s Central Bank. Consequences of war would be terrible; potentially catastrophic in the event of a war spinning out of control as the result of preemptive strategies, panic and decentralized and fragmented Iranian command and control structure. The Supreme Leader most likely also underrates the capabilities of Israel and Saudi Arabia – and fails to grasp the extent of their desperation facing a threat they perceive as almost of existential gravity.  At the same time, the previous Iranian leverage against Israel by way of Hezbollah has now been weakened by developments in Syria, the Iranian route to Lebanon, a change leaving Israel less vulnerable to Iranian counterattack. Israel could easily weaken further Iran’s collusion with Syria by compromising on the Golan Heights. A regime change in Syria, still pending, could present Israel with a window of opportunity to dramatically improve its strategic position versus Iran.

Israel’s current government could, in spite of dire warnings to the contrary by Israeli military and intelligence experts, be bent on stopping by preemptive attack Iran’s nuclear program, irrespective of risks and consequences because they perceive it as an existential threat. Their assumption is probably that an Israeli attack would force the hand of any US president to join, should Israeli forces prove insufficient.

But would the now war-weary US public necessarily support a new risky military campaign in the region after the attrition in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially if the war were precipitated by another country –even Israel? Also, by escalating the military and political leverage against the Iranian leaders beyond a certain point, the unintended side effect could be to strengthen the domestic support for the Iranian regime by rallying also opposition forces behind the leadership, otherwise divisive, in an effort to contain perceived threats to the nation (even if some blame President Ahmadinnejad for enabling aggression against Iran by his provoking rhetoric). Consequently, the very strong US response to the alleged Iranian assassination plot against the Saudi Ambassador to Washington, a stepped-up political pressure probably intended also in defense of Israel, could prove self-defeating as a diplomatic strategy: The pressure, by inducing Iranians to rally behind the otherwise resented regime, could inadvertently provide cunning Iranian leaders with a motive to create the kinds of threats the pressure was intended to contain.

Saudi Arabia’s royal family probably feels left vulnerable by the US policy of not supporting allied rulers against their domestic opposition in Egypt and Bahrain, as well as by the Shia protests in the Eastern provinces and Bahrain, which they attribute to Iranian influence. The recent allegations of an Iranian plot to kill the Saudi Ambassador to Washington have no doubt confirmed the Saudi perception of a threatening, dangerous Iran. To counter both the unsettling force of the Arab spring and the Iranian threat, they now seem to seek closer collusion with Israel, possibly including operational cooperation in the case of an Israeli preemptive attack on Iran’s nuclear installations. Furthermore, the Saudi royal family probably sees their huge arms procurements both as a means to acquire allies as well as a prepositioning of equipment for US and other forces in case of war with Iran. But has Saudi Arabia surrendered the ultimate decision of attack to others less vulnerable? Saudi Arabia’s vital oil fields would be within striking distance of an Iran bent on counterattack, which, given the decentralized and fragmented Iranian command and control structure, could easily spin out of control. As a consequence, Saudi Arabia could conceivably end up suffering the main collateral damage of an attack against Iran.

Su Tzu also said, in Chapter XII, The Attack by Fire, “the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good general is full of caution.”

Whereas the revolts in Tunisia and Egypt at the beginning of the Arab spring led to regime falls, the Bahraini one did not and the Al Khalifa royal family is still ruling the small island just off the Saudi coast. In fact, the only thing that has fallen so far in the kingdom is the Pearl monument at the Pearl Roundabout in the capital Manama,  thought to be to the Bahraini revolution what Tahrir was to the Egyptian. It was bulldozed in March when the protesters residing there were dispersed by force.

Even though the anti-government demonstrations prevails across the country and the state security police are out almost every night charging and arresting demonstrators the regime is working hard to give the impression that Bahrain has entered a post-revolt phase. Following the lift of the state of emergency on June 1st a set of steps have been made to give the impression that Bahrain is on its way back to a more stabile political situation[i].

One step was the introduction of what was called a national dialogue in July, where oppositional forces were invited to discuss matters of political, economical, social and human rights reform with the government. Al Wifaq, the main oppositional group that pulled out of the parliament in March in reaction to the governments repression of demonstrations this spring, decided to boycott the dialogue after having attended some of the sessions. Rejecting strongly the regimes emphasis on socioeconomic problems rather than political ones as the root of the protests this spring, they also decided to boycott the by-elections in September/October. The elections were conducted to fill the 18 seats that became vacant after al-Wifaq pulled out of parliament. This being another step by the regime to bring political life in the kingdom back to a more normal state, ignoring the demonstrations still happening across the country. At the opening of parliament on October 9th King Al Khalifa stated in his opening speech that it now is the duty of the Cabinet and the Parliament to take the recommandations from the national dialogue in July into practice and legislation if needed. According to the king significant political reforms are underway including granting the parliament more power and implementing stricter guidelines for nominations for the Upper House (Shura Council. The Bahraini parliament consists of two houses, an elected lower house, and a nominated upper house). The current voting districts, often accused of being gerrymandered to secure a sunni majority in the parliament, are being reviewed to ensure, according to the king, «that Bahrain’s citizens are given fair representation in their electoral constituencies»[ii].

A third step was the establishing of The Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry by the king on June 29th this year. The committee, consisting of five non-bahrainis, is tasked with investigating and reporting on the events that took place in Bahrain from February 2011, and the consequences of those events. In other words, to map out the alleged violations of human rights by the state security forces and give recommandations on what its consequences should be[iii].

And so how successful have these steps been in taking Bahrain into a post-revolt state? Well, the easy answer would be not very. Demonstrations are still ongoing, no real reform is seen and and the fact that the Saudi military forces have not completely pulled out those not convey an image of stability or normality (supposing the political situation in Bahrain was stabile and normal prior to the uprising). True, the demonstrations are on a smaller scale than earlier this year, but that is mainly due to a severe crack down on them, rather than the demonstrators pulling out having achieved their objects. Even though the king has promised political reform, no real evidence is seen of it. The fact that al Wifaq has pulled out of the parliamentary system (and the voter turnout in September in some districts was less than 20 %), harms its legitimacy and illustrates the royal families failure to convince the population that it is taking its demands seriously.

In addition the Commission of Enquiry is accused of being biased towards the governments interests and the fact that it is nominated by the king does not help in this regard. The issue is addressed at the commissions official webpage stating in its defence that it «has benefited from a consultation process with various bodies, including the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights». Still many Bahrainis do not expect the commission to map out the breaches of human rights in a sufficent way, despite the commissions postponing of its report from October 23rd to November 23rd saying it needs more time to review in depth the 8800 complaints it has heard and the 5700 interviews it has conducted[iv].

What will be interesting to see is whether the commissions findings and recommandations will be acted on. In the opening speech of the parliament the king promised it would. How much that is related to the $53 million American arms deal Bahrain is trying to close, is difficult to say. A spokesman of the American State Department said on October 18th it would look closely at the report and «continue to take human rights considerations into account as we move toward the finalization of this deal”. At least half a dozen senators have written to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton criticizing Bahrains human rights violations, claiming «completion of the arms sale would weaken U.S. credibility amid democratic transitions in the Middle East». Some reports claim the deal is already finalized. If it turns out to be, a strong American statement is made that they view Bahrain as being in a somewhat post-revolt phase, as many would claim selling weapons to a state handling a revolt would be questionable, despite the arms supposedly only being meant for «external use»[v].

Iran’s parliament elections are scheduled to take place in early March 2012.[1] Last two parliament elections were engineered by Iran’s Guardian Council of the Constitution in such a way that conservative forces close to Mahmud Ahmadinezhad won the majority of the seats in the parliament. Disqualification of hundreds of reform oriented candidates in the previous parliament elections and the suspicious results of 2009 presidential election convinced reform oriented forces close to Iran’s former president Mohammad Khatami, to stay away from the debates on 2012 parliament elections. While conservative political organizations and politicians supporting Ahamadinezhad in the 2009 presidential elections are preparing themselves for the coming elections they express their concern over the consequences of eventual absence of reform oriented forces in the elections which may put popular legitimacy of the political system in danger.[2] The absence of reform oriented forces in the election would certainly result in low voter turnout, something the Islamic Republic has tried to avoid throughout its history even though it has not always been able to handle the consequences of high voter turnouts as the outcomes of the 2009 presidential election have shown. The 2009 presidential candidates Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karoubi who contested the results of the election are now under house-arrest and many politicians and political activists who supported them in their presidential campaign have been sentenced to prison and their newspapers and organizations closed down. Right now, reform oriented forces led by Khatami are united behind the demands he put forward as a condition of their participation in the elections according to which all political prisoners must be released, freedom of expression and assembly must be protected, and finally free and fair elections must be guaranteed by the government.[3] Since last year, Khatami reiterated these demands several times but has not received any positive response from the conservatives in power. The reluctance of the reform oriented forces to be engaged in the debates on the coming elections has irritated veteran conservative figures who assume that the reform oriented forces may pursue undercover electoral strategies in the elections. According to this supposedly secrete strategy they will not participate in the elections officially but would select and support candidates declared by the Guardian Council as qualified candidates provided they follow a reform oriented politics in the parliament.[4]  The absence of the reform oriented forces from the coming elections makes the efforts of the conservative forces with their meetings, debates and negotiations to form a joint list of candidates in the coming elections to look like a worthless effort since the elections seem to lack real electoral competition. While the absence of a real electoral opponent should have made conservative forces to expect an easy electoral victory, it makes them more cynical and has intensified their divisions and inner fighting. At the moment, there are three conservative sub-factions expecting to win the majority of the seats in the new parliament. Traditional conservatives alliance the United Front of Principalists (jebheye motahed-e osulgarayan) led by the current president of Iran’s Assembly of Experts, Ayatollah Mahdavi Kkani, the neo-conservative radical forces, which paved the way for Ahamdinezhad’s  presidency in 2005 and 2009, in the Resistance Front (jebheye paidari) led by Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi and finally supporters of Ahmadinezhad’s chief of staff, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaiy referred to as deviators (monhatefin) by their conservative rivals.[5]

The traditional conservatives believe they would benefit from participation of reform oriented forces in the elections, because it would restore the popular legitimacy the state enjoyed but has been seriously damaged in the aftermath of 2009 presidential election and force Ahmadinezhad’s allies to obey the majority rule within the conservative faction which they have ignored in the previous elections since 2005. But popular legitimacy is a strange word for Ahamdinezhad and his neo-conservative allies whether in the Resistance Front or among those backing Rahim Mashaiy. They both prefer to get rid of reform oriented candidates at all costs.

The traditional conservative faction has good reason to worry about unpredicted consequences of its internal rivalry and the informal support of reform oriented forces to little known reform oriented parliamentary candidates. In the case of a unified conservative list of candidates, the Guardian Council would have an easy job to disqualify unwanted candidates but it might be unable to perform its function satisfactorily when conservatives forces enter the elections with different lists of candidates, because in that case unknown reform oriented candidates cannot be easily recognized, classified and disqualified. There is a chance, the conservatives assume, that as a consequence of their internal confusion the reform oriented forces come out victorious from the elections without compromising their demands as a condition for their electoral participation. Unlike presidential elections in which voters distinguish candidates according to their political affiliations and in terms of their reformist or conservative approach, parliament elections entail many regional and local interests and concerns. For instance, there is an elite competition between Arabs and non-Arabs in the province of Khuzestan which has been exploited by conservatives close to Ahmadinezhad and Mohsen Rezaiy, former commanders of the Revolutionary Guard, in the previous elections and it will be exploited in the forthcoming elections as well. While the former can mobilize Arab voters behind Arab candidates in the south-west of the province, the latter would invest his political influence in the north-east of the province to mobilize non-e Arab voters behind his own candidates. With regard to the split within the conservative faction in this province, reform oriented forces may support Arab or non-Arab candidates advocating local causes and would like to join the reform oriented politics. The political scene in the province of Bushehr is friendlier for such reform oriented electoral maneuvering since the local public sphere in this region is dominated by local intellectuals and political activists who are unanimous in their support for democratic reforms on a local and national scale. Local intellectuals and political activists in this region would support reform oriented candidates since they can transmit their voice and discuss local grievances in the parliament and force governments to take the interests of their province and cities into consideration.[6] The current representatives of Bushehr in the parliament are supportive of reform oriented city councils and local non-governmental organizations and raise their voice against central government’s policies in the region. So it is more likely that local intellectuals and political activists in this region give their support to, at least, two current parliament members if they stand as parliament candidate and are qualified by the Guardian Council.[7]

By: Bjørn Olav Utvik

Nobelkomiteen har gjort et godt valg i år: den samtidige prisen til Liberia og Jemen setter enkeltmottakerne i et bredere freds- og demokratiperspektiv.

Spesielt viktig og gledelig i forhold til den arabiske våren er det at en av de tre vinnerne er Tawakkul Karman. Karman er født i 1979. Hun er en journalist og politisk aktivist med tilknytning til Jemens viktigste opposisjonsparti, det islamistiske Reformpartiet (al-Islah). Hun leder foreningen Kvinnelige journalister uten lenker som hun grunnla i 2005.

Karman kom i internasjonale medias søkelys da hun tidlig under demonstrasjonene sist vinter ble arrestert. Kravet om at hun skulle frigis ble raskt et fokus i de videre demonstrasjonene og store bilder av Tawakkul Karman preget gatene i de jemenittiske byene. Karman har fortsatt å stå sentralt i protestene mot president Salehs diktatoriske styre. Ikke minst er hun en av drivkreftene i den sterke mobiliseringen av ungdommen.

Prisen til Karman er viktig og bra av en rekke grunner. Her er noen:
- Den peker på kvinnenes viktige rolle i revolusjonene, og samtidig på hvor viktig kampen for kvinnefrigjøring er i fortsettelsen. Jemen er et av de aller mest konservative arabiske landene når det gjelder sosiale skikker generelt, og ikke minst i forholdet mellom kjønnene. Men i motsetning til i for eksempel Libya har kvinnene (de aller fleste i niqab) spilt en viktig rolle i gatedemonstrasjonene for frihet og demokrati i byer som Sanaa, Taizz og Aden. Likevel er faren stor for at spørsmålet om kvinners kår og rettigheter kan bli stilt på venteliste etter en eventuell seier over Salehs regime. Her er Karman viktig fordi hun står solid plantet i landets islamistbevegelse samtidig som hun aktivt fremmer kvinnenes sak

- Tawakkul Karman er altså et framtredende medlem av Jemens viktigste politiske parti på opposisjonssida, det islamistiske Reformpartiet (Islah). Hun er medlem av partiets Shura-råd. Samtidig har hun ikke vært redd for å ta en fight med den konservative salafi-fløyen i dette partiet om kvinners rettigheter. Blant annet har hun stått i spissen for en kampanje for å heve giftealderen for kvinner til 17 år. Og det var en viktig symbolhandling da i 2004 droppet niqaben (som 90 prosent av jemenittiske kvinner, også utdannede, går med). Hun oppfordrer også andre kvinner til å slutte å dekke til ansiktet.

- Fredsprisen til Karman kan forhåpentlig bidra til å flytte fokuset i mediedekningen av Jemen tilbake fra stammer, al-Qaida og militære, til de sentrale revolusjonskreftene: ungdommen og den politiske opposisjonen. Man kan lett få inntrykk av at uroen i Jemen dreier seg om klanstrider og kamp mellom ulike krigsherrer, med al-Qaida lurende i kulissene. Men selv om dette også er en del av bildet, er opprøret sentralt drevet fram av den samme typen demokratikrefter som i resten av den arabiske verden. Ungdom av ulike politiske avskygninger har gått i spissen, men bak står også en usedvanlig brei politisk allianse for demokratisering som er bygd opp over mange år. De såkalte ”fellesmøte-partiene” har stått sammen for endring og omfatter et ideologisk spekter fra det islamistiske Reformpartiet til Sosialistparitet som er arvtakerne til det gamle regjeringsparitet i det marxistiske regimet som hersket i Sør-Jemen før sammenslåingen i 1990.

Karman står midt i denne politiske opposisjonen og det er å håpe at fredsprisen vil bringe den tilbake i medienes fokus når de rapporterer fra Jemen.